POTA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM INDIA’S ANTI-                TERROR ACT

 Abstract:

 Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, India passed its own anti-terrorism ordinance, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), following a terrorist attack on India’s Parliament building in December 2001. As with the USA PATRIOT Act, Indian legislators acted quickly, declaring the Act to be a necessary weapon against terrorism. But POTA, like the USA PATRIOT Act, had detractors, who criticized the law as unnecessary and draconian. Among other potentially dangerous measures, POTA allowed for 180-day detentions without charge, presumptions of guilt, sketchy review procedures, summary trials and trials in absentia. In many ways, POTA was harsher than the USA PATRIOT Act, but then again, so is India’s terrorist threat. In September 2004, a new central government repealed POTA, but other vigorous anti-terror laws are likely to follow. This Note evaluates the most dangerous provisions of POTA, how officials abused those provisions, and what lessons India and the United States can learn from the experience.

Introduction                                                                                                                                            

• The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 sent shockwaves of fear and insecurity far beyond the borders of the United States. India in particular had reason to be afraid, and its fear was not merely for the 250 Indian citizens who were trapped in the burning towers of the World Trade Center.1 As a nation already at war with terror, it was clear that the struggle was about to get harder.2 Since gaining independence fifty years ago, India has seen the assassination of its most prominent civil rights leader, a prime minister, a former prime minis[*PG262]ter, and a retired Army chief.3 Moreover, for over ten years, India has been fighting insurgents in Kashmir, including Islamic radicals from Pakistan and Afghanistan.4 As of the fall of 2001, terrorists in Kashmir had killed thousands of civilians, policemen, and Indian soldiers, and violence raged on.5 Add to these concerns the continued separatist violence in India’s northeast, the potential threat of the Tamil Tigers in the south, and the existence of an organized, international crime network distributing weapons and explosives to all of the above, and it is unsurprising that government officials felt compelled to act swiftly and forcefully in the wake of Al Qaeda’s assault on the United States.6 
•  India’s Union Cabinet issued the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) in October 2001.7 The central government claimed its action was a response to “an upsurge of terrorist activities, intensification of cross border terrorism, and insurgent groups in different parts of the country.”8 The ordinance granted state law enforcement sweeping powers to investigate, detain, and prosecute for a wide range of terrorist-related offenses.9 Most notably, POTO targeted those who allegedly incited, supported, abetted, harbored, concealed, or benefited from the proceeds of terrorism.
• 10To some, POTO bore an ominous resemblance to the notorious Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (hereinafter TADA), which lapsed in 1995 after years of abuse.11 Despite some initial criticism, however, events in India soon made POTO an apparent necessity to the ruling coalition and many other legislators.12 On December 13, 2001, Muslim terrorists, allegedly backed by Pakistan, attacked the Indian parliament in a failed attempt to assassinate legislators.13 The [*PG264]Cabinet condemned the attack as targeting “the very heart of our system of governance, on what is the symbol and the keystone of the largest democracy in the world.”14 Three months later, during a rare joint session convened at the Prime Minister’s request, the temporary ordinance became the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA)        
• After the legislature passed POTA in March of 2002, the Indian media and human rights groups observed and criticized frequent abuses of the law, including hundreds of questionable and prolonged detentions with no formal charges filed.16 The most visible of these involved political figures arrested by rivals in control of state law enforcement machinery.17 Most abuses arising in the form of prolonged detention without charges, however, went unreported, as the targets were often members of disempowered minorities lacking a forum in which to voice the mistreatment.18 Detainees languished in jail for weeks or months while the wheels of India’s overburdened criminal [*PG265]justice system creaked slowly along.19 Despite the existence of special courts to expedite the process, at least in theory, they did little to counter POTA’s permissive stance on such lengthy incarcerations.20 Provisions for oversight were similarly impotent.21 Some of these problems stemmed from the law’s broad text, while others were rooted in its enforcement
• In September 2004, a new central government repealed POTA, but other vigorous anti-terror laws are likely to follow.23 India’s experience under POTA is a cautionary tale from which both Indian and U.S. lawmakers might learn. This Note examines how certain provisions of POTA lent themselves to abuse and suggests ways to avoid similar abuses in future anti-terror laws, wherever they may be written and applied. Part I of this Note describes the tools India used prior to POTA to combat terrorist threats throughout the country. Provisions of POTA that are particularly susceptible to abuse are examined in Part II. Part III focuses on how law enforcement officials and politicians misused or abused POTA during the past two years, particularly with improper arrests, prolonged detentions, and ineffective oversight. Part IV examines how the Indian government can avoid some of POTA’s shortcomings in the future. Finally, Part V considers the lessons the United States can and should draw from India’s experience with POTA.

 POTA in Context: Fighting Terror on the Subcontinent

•     POTA was only India’s latest tool in combating the continually evolving terrorist threat, which has emerged in several parts of the country since its independence from Great Britain in 1947. One of India’s earliest terrorist experiences is also one of its most notorious: the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by a Hindu extremist on January 31, 1948.24 Subsequent terrorist attacks involved large and persistent regional groups fighting for secession.25 As a large, multi-ethnic, post-colonial nation still in development, India is particularly vulnerable to violent political movements predicated upon geography, ethnicity, language, and religion
• To preserve public order and national security, India’s Constituent Assembly drafted the Constitution of India to grant explicitly to state and federal legislatures the power to enact laws providing for preventative detention.27 This practice involves incarcerating individuals based upon the suspicion that such individuals may commit a crime in the future.28 Both central and state governments incorporated preventative detention provisions—albeit subject to certain constitutional safeguards—in several pieces of legislation throughout India’s turbulent history. For example, during a decade of gruesome terrorist violence in the State of Punjab, the central government passed the National Security Act (NSA) and TADA, both of which permitted preventative detentions under broadly defined conditions.29 Similarly, in Jammu and Kashmir, the state government passed [*PG267]the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act of 1978 (PSA), which contained equally harsh preventative detention provisions.30 Although several preventative detention laws have since expired, the NSA and PSA remain operative.
• In extreme cases, the Indian government has employed the military to combat terrorism. The Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act of 1958 allowed the state governor of Assam and Manipur to declare all or part of the state a “Disturbed Area,” wherein military officers had discretion to kill armed individuals or groups and to conduct searches and arrests without warrants.32 The Indian [*PG268]government later invoked variants of this law in both Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir
• Thus, given its history of turbulence, it is not surprising that India’s latest anti-terror law was more ruthless than its U.S. counterpart.34 POTA was more moderate, however, than India’s prior national security laws.35 It neither involved the military nor provided explicitly for preventative detention, although it did resurrect large portions of TADA.36 Other provisions, however, such as those permitting prolonged detentions with minimal judicial oversight, were virtually as dangerous.

Conclusion

• The United States has been waging war on terrorists since September 11, 2001. India has been waging that war for over fifty years, and has learned a great deal from its successes and failures. No politician since Indira Gandhi has suspended the constitution. After heavy-handed action within Punjab, the Indian military now fights its largest anti-terror battles at the border. TADA’s widespread abuse and unpopularity instructed legislators to include enhanced safeguards in POTA. Abuses persist, however, and the learning must continue. India must continue to refine broad definitions of terrorist offenses and guard against arbitrary detentions motivated by politics, prejudice, or haste. In this regard, the world’s largest democracy and the world’s richest have much in common. India’s lessons are America’s lessons, too. For students of the war on terror, the classroom has no walls.
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WTO's  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”) and examine how much of India's policies are consistent with these measures.

• India is threatening to block the World Trade Organization (WTO)'s trade facilitation agreement (TFA) reached at Bali last year unless its agricultural policies are permanently excluded from multilateral scrutiny. Is the objective - on agriculture - valid? Are the tactics - blocking Bali - sensible?
• The short answers, elaborated below, are, respectively: yes, supporting agriculture is valid, but no, the tactic may be less so
• Objectives: preserving agricultural policies
  India wants to head off potential challenges by its trading partners to its policy of minimum support prices (MSPs) for rice and wheat, which could potentially breach India's obligations undertaken in the Uruguay Round. There, India agreed to limit support to farmers via domestic subsidies (called "aggregate measurement of support", or AMS). Trading partners also want India to curtail any potential exporting of excess food stocks at subsidised prices.
• The root of the problem is the gap between the structure of India's polices and the structure of itsWTO obligations. This gap owes to a sharp rise in world agricultural prices since 2007, combined with a major expansion of India's domestic commitment to subsidise consumers of foodstuffs.
• India's agricultural policies used to consist of protecting farmers via tariffs and subsidising consumers via the public distribution system. India provided little support for farmers via the MSPs, which remained well below international prices until very recently.
• The Uruguay Round essentially codified these policies, giving India leeway to raise tariffs on rice to between 70 and 80 per cent and on wheat 100 per cent without breaching the WTO obligations. The generous freedom to protect farmers via tariffs that India had obtained and the fact that India at that time had few domestic subsidies led it and other developing countries to pay less attention to their obligations on domestic subsidies, which were set at a relatively constricting 10 per cent of output.
• Advanced countries, by contrast, had tighter obligations on tariffs, which they had to reduce by 36 per cent from levels that were generally lower than that for developing countries. They were also obliged to reduce export subsidies by 36 per cent. But they were allowed more space to support their farmers via domestic subsidies reflected in smaller reductions (only 20 per cent) in their domestic subsidies.
• When the food-price shock hit the world, the focus in India and elsewhere shifted dramatically from the producer to the consumer. India slashed its tariffs (from about 30-50 per cent to near-zero for rice and wheat), raised the MSPs for farmers, and expanded food subsidies, culminating in the food subsidy Bill enacted by the previous United Progressive Alliance government.
• Using tariffs to protect farmers was eliminated because the cost to consumers would be too high, as would the cost to the government of subsidising consumers. So the government had to switch to domestic subsidies via generous MSPs that also enabled it to procure stocks for food security purposes.
• In structure, therefore India's agricultural policies - on the producer side - started to resemble that of advanced countries a few years ago. (Of course, the food-price increases of 2007 have led to some automatic reductions in production-related subsidies in advanced countries; they have over time also moved toward more direct support for farmers decoupled from production, the so-called "green box" of permissible subsidies in the WTO.)
• But these policy changes were not reflected in the structure of India's WTO obligations. The oddity is that India is permitted by the WTO to adopt the inefficient policy of raising tariffs but unable to pursue the less inefficient policy of the MSPs.
• There are two ways out of this dilemma: changing domestic policies or changing WTO obligations. India's domestic agricultural policies have improved considerably but remain inefficient: food subsidies and even income support to poor farmers should gradually be replaced by cash transfers (which would be WTO-consistent "green box" subsidies). But implementing such changes takes time - several decades in the case of even the United States and Europe. India's concern to not be prematurely forced into such ideal policies is, thus, not unreasonable
• So India must attempt to change the structure of India's WTO obligations. The experts, Ashok Gulati and Anwarul Hoda, have suggested that the WTO change the way it calculates domestic subsidies, giving India more wiggle room to continue its current policies. Such an approach makes sense, especially because the current calculations are, absurdly, based on international prices that prevailed nearly three decades ago. This change in measurement is desirable but India's problems may well go beyond the measurement of subsidies.
•  India would be saying to rich countries, "Our agricultural policies are similar to yours, so we want our WTO obligations to be similar to yours, too." It could argue further that the structure of obligations is biased against India, because rich countries can subsidise agricultural exports while India cannot.
• Tactics: blocking the TFA:Is holding up the TFA the best way for India to secure its objectives on agriculture?
• The July 31 deadline for adoption of the Bali agreement does provide India some leverage to advance its broader objectives on agriculture.
• 
  Despite the criticism, India is not standing in the way of great global trade advancement. Gains from the TFA have been grossly overstated. Reforming Customs administration, a key ingredient of trade facilitation, is important, but the TFA neither adequately provides incentives nor forces such reforms that will be politically difficult within member countries.
  
  Nevertheless, opposing the TFA is perceived as obstructionism. The reputational costs for the new government that is trying to project an image of being investor- and market-friendly and constructive in its international engagement are potentially high.
  
  Moreover, India seems isolated in its current position, with China, Brazil, Russia - the band of BRIC brothers - and other emerging market countries distancing themselves from New Delhi. A policy that has limited support in the WTO looks weak and lacks legitimacy, and, hence, is unlikely to succeed.
  
  Indeed if India succeeds in its opposition, and the Bali deal collapses, the blow to an already weak WTO would be significant and India would bear much of the blame. And the costs of a weak multilateral trade system are greater for countries such as India, which is excluded from the emerging Asian trade architecture underpinned by the United States-led Trans-Pacific Partnership
  
  India should, thus, withdraw its opposition to the TFA, reformulate its position on agriculture, proceed to persuade its partners of the merits and fairness of its new position over the next few months, and revisit this issue at the WTO in the near future.

“Continuing Communal Riots in India Are the Result of Both History and Contemporary Politics.”

• India’s Home Ministry reveals that more than 2,500 people were killed in incidents of communal clashes in the country since 2002. There were 8,500 incidents of communal clashes in the past decade, mostly between the Hindus and Muslims. Some say that the violence between these two communities continues thanks to the gap of communal mistrust between them which is primarily attributed to historical wrongs.
• And some analysts say that it’s all because of politics and policies of some political parties. There have been efforts to address communal violence through legislations and other policy measures though.. The Communal Violence Bill, one of those efforts, has itself been labelled as Communal. Some have appreciated the bill.
• Do you agree with the topic completely or are there other reasons behind communal clashes? What are the dangers of these communal clashes? How can we stop them? Are legislations only way to stop them? What is the role of administration? What is the role of society and individuals? Is there any flaw in our education system itself?

1.  communal politics are “solely” a political phenomenon. Be it the crusades war, be it Hindu-Muslim conflicts, be it Arab-Jew wars or Christian – Islam war, all of them have political reasons behind them.
   Majority of the people are busy working for their livelihood everyday – Food, shelter and clothing is their mantra. I don’t think they have time to fight with others over whose imaginary friend is better and whose is not. The main reasons for all communal conflicts can be traced back to very small incidents which are usually started by political people with malicious intents.
   So, people are inherently peace-loving, until someone plants an idea of a communal clash. Be it Lord Curzon or Jinnah, many of the communal clashes are due to the actions of some political person trying to gain some advantage of such a riot.
2. Communal violence in indian context is , to a little extent, different from it’s format in other parts of the world.
   Here the communal clashes as well as clashes between two groups are a general phenomenon starting with a very trivial issue.
   In, my opinion HISTORICAL WRONGS and contemporary situation , created deliberately, both are responsible for this.
   REMEDY.
   Executive side of the govt. (MinsterS & administration both) should be impartial in handling riot situation, and it is far better to take preventive steps in the early stage.
   Police should be free from any UNDUE political pressure and it should learn a lesson from indian Army.
   LEGISLATURE. must make a objective and impartial law without any bias and without thinking of political milage.
   JUDICIARY must keep it’s strictness continue regarding communal matters.
   NGOs must help in creating an environment of trust and affection between various communities Any attempt to misinterpret  history should be dealt by an iron hand
   SOCIAL MEDIA. A effective check must be on various social media like. Facebook and WhatsApp.
   PUBLIC. should also be careful and should not believe in rumours. It must not shun the humanity in any circumstances. The teachings of QURAN, GEETA, BIBLE, and other religious testimonials should be remembered and acted upon in the time of disturbance 
3. There is no doubt that all most every communal riot that occur has some political behind them . It is mostly the discriminatory policies that fuel the communal feeling . However it is also because of lack of education that people get influenced by these policies. Education often helps to promote tolrence . If the trend of victimisation of communal riot is noticed it is mostly the poor and uneducated who are targeted by the semi educated or uneducated of another community .
   The purpose of education should not only be promotion of litreracy ,rather , it should aim towards multipurpose goals . Childhood is the building bock of any humans behiovour , if we teach each and every child to respect different cultures and religions , such incidence will surely lessen .
   It is important to sensitied human to wards other cultures and religions , it is equally important to promote economic ,social and political democracy . Though political parties ,that are involve in communal riots ,have political motives behind their purpose . But the common man who gets involve in these riots are motivated by economic and social purpose . Inequality in income and acess to social services creates fear and anger that push people to extreme . Therefore government should create equal opportunities for all which promote economic social and political democracy

White Label ATM - India ? What are WLAs ?

 Background / White Label ATM in Canada and India :

White label ATMs are popular in Canada.   Since 2006, some banks have been pressing with RBI to introduce white label  ATMs in India too.   On 14th February, 2012, RBI has issued  DRAFT  guidelines and asked the comments of the bankers and public in this regard.   Thus, these guidelines are still not applicable but are likely to be soon approved.

• Definition and Meaning of White Label  ATM -  India ?  or What is White Label ATM ? or What is WLA ? 
  
  
  White Label ATM or White Label Automated Teller Machines or WLAs in India will be owned and operated by Non Bank entities.  From such White Label ATM customer from any bank will be able to withdraw money, but will need to pay a fee for the services.    These white label automated teller machines (ATMs) will not display logo of any particular bank and are likely to be located in non traditional places.
  
  

Who will benefit from White Label ATMs :

The white label automated teller machines are likely to benefit customers as well as banks.   With the expansion of ATM network, customers will be able to withdraw funds at more locations which will be convenient and located near to their home or place of work.   Banks too support introduction of white label ATMs as such machines are likely to reduce pre-transaction cost for them and will be free from the problems relating to maintaining and running such a payment channel

What Problems are Likely to be Faced by Bankers and Customers :

Bankers are already sounding caution about the pitfalls of white label ATMs.  The first and foremost concern for customers will be the inconvenience they may feel in case of failed transactions on WLAs.  In such cases the dispute resolution mechanism will involve three entities — the WLA operator, the sponsor bank of the operator, and the customer's bank.  The WLA operators being non bank entities and running purely on profit basis may take longer time or avoid payments on account of failed transactions.   The second concern for customers will be the high cost they are likely to pay for use of such ATMs.

What are the Open Market Operations (OMOs)

An open market operation (popularly also known as OMO) is an activity by a central bank to buy or sell government securities  on the open market.  Central banks use these operations as the primary means of implementing monetary policy.

Thus we can say that in India OMOs are the market operations conducted by the Reserve Bank of India (it is central bank of India) by way of sale/ purchase of Government securities to/ from the market with an objective to adjust the rupee liquidity conditions in the market on a durable basis

1. Sale of Government Securities :

When the RBI feels there is excess liquidity in the market, it resorts to sale of securities thereby sucking out the rupee liquidity. It is simple operation, wherein RBI sells the government securities to banks, who pay for these investments.  Thus excess liquidity goes to RBI.

Purchase or  BuyBack of Government Securities :

When RBI feels that the liquidity conditions are tight, it will purchase  / buy back  securities from the market, thereby releasing liquidity into the market.  Under this operation, RBI purchases government securities from banks and thus pays the bank equivalent amount to banks.  Thus, liquidity is injected into the system.

Collateralised Borrowing and Lending Obligation (CBLO)

This is another money market instrument used in India.  This is  operated by the Clearing Corporation of India Ltd. (CCIL), for the benefit of the entities who have either no access to the inter bank call money market or have restricted access in terms of ceiling on call borrowing and lending transactions.

CBLO is a discounted instrument available in electronic book entry form for the maturity period ranging from one day to ninety days (up to one year as per RBI guidelines). In order to enable the market participants to borrow and lend funds, CCIL provides the Dealing System through Indian Financial Network (INFINET), a closed user group to the Members of the Negotiated Dealing System (NDS) who maintain Current account with RBI and through Internet for other entities who do not maintain Current account with RBI.

Repo market

Repo : We have seen above LAF and now that it is conducted through Repos and Reverse Repos.  The Repo is also known as ready forward contact, and is an instrument for borrowing funds by selling securities with an agreement to repurchase the said securities on a mutually agreed future date at an agreed price which includes interest for the funds borrowed. Thus under Repo, banks borrow from RBI and thus liquidity comes to banking system.

Reverse Repo : The reverse of the repo transaction is called ‘reverse repo’ which is lending of funds against buying of securities with an agreement to resell the said securities on a mutually agreed future date at an agreed price which includes interest for the funds lent.   Thus, under Revere Repo banks lend money to RBI and thus liquidity reduces in the banking system.

Bharatiya Mahila Bank

• Bharatiya Mahila Bank  (BMB) is an Indian financial services banking company based in New Delhi, India.
• .Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh inaugurated the system on 19 November 2013 on the occasion of the 94th birth anniversary of former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
•  Although initially reported as a bank exclusively for women, the bank allows deposits to flow from everyone, but lending will be predominantly for women
•  India is the third country in the world to have a bank especially for women, after Pakistan and Tanzania
• The bank has been criticized as adopting a segregational approach to gender equality
• Usha Ananthasubramanian has appointed as Chairman and MD
• In India, only 26% of women have an account with a formal financial institution, compared with 46% of men. That means an account in either a bank, a credit union, a co-operative, post office or a microfinance institution, according to a study by the World Bank

• OBJECTIVES OF BMB

• The bank will also place emphasis on funding for skills developments to help in economic activity. Moreover, the products will be designed in a manner to give a slight concession on loan rates to women
• 
  
• The bank shall also aim to inspire people with entrepreneurial skills and, in conjunction with NGOs, plans to locally mobilize women to train them in vocations like toy-making or driving tractors or mobile repairs, according to Usha Ananthasubramanian

• One of the other objectives of the bank is to promote asset ownership amongst women customers. Studies have shown that asset ownership amongst women reduces their risk of suffering from domestic violence

• CAPITAL:

• The Bank's initial capital consists of Rs 1,000 crores. The government plans to have 25 branches of the said bank by the end of March 2014 and 500 branches by 4th year of operation (2017)

• BRANCHES:
• The government has chosen the iconic Air India building at Nariman Point in Mumbai to open the first branch of Bank
• The government has chosen the iconic Air India building at Nariman Point in Mumbai to open the first branch of Bank

• KEY MANAGEMENT:
• Initially the bank will have a board of directors consisting of eight women
• The board consists of a business graduate sarpanch from Rajasthan
•  Chhavi Rajawat,
•  Dalitentrepreneur Kalpana Saroj, who turned around a tubes business
•  retired public banker Nupur Mitra
•  academic Pakiza Samad
•  private equity professional Renuka Ramnath
• Godrej Group executive Director Tanya Dubash and Priya Kumar, a government nominee

Economic Survey 2014: Govt has an agenda to liberalise agricultural markets, looks at ways to cut subsidies 
Read more at:

 The Modi government has advocated far reaching reforms in food production, distribution and marketing, and suggested food stamps or direct transfer of subsidy instead of procurement and distribution to subsidy, as well as a Central law to end the grip of middlemen, the Economic Survey said.

• It also proposed corporate involvement in facilitating farmer markets and setting up supply-chain infrastructure by including these activities in the list of activities under corporate social response  
• The government says a change in approach towards grain procurement is necessary. It said foodgrains are central to food security but it also wants to take into account data that shows that expenditure on cereals in rural India has fallen from 24.2 per cent of total consumption expenditure in 1993-94 to 12 per cent in 2011-12.
• In urban areas it has fallen to 7.3 per cent from 14 per cent over the same period. "The continued emphasis on procurement and distribution of rice and wheat is contrary to the ground reality that shows changing preference functions of consumers. A shift to a direct cash transfer system or food stamps would anchor our food policy to the requirements of the people and would additionally reduce fiscal deficit," the survey said
• The Survey notes that the system of Agricultural Produce Marketing Committees (APMC), which forces farmers to sell only at mandis has outlived its utility. It says the Centre has powers to change the way farm produce is sold in states. It said states had created trade barriers. 
• To establish a common, national market, it has also suggested review of the Land Tenancy Act, pursuing direct marketing and contract farming, examining the inclusion of agri-related taxes under the General Goods and Services Tax (GST) and providing incentives to the private sector to scale up incentives. Traders said a common market won't help. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement

1. The 123 Agreement signed between the United States of America and the Republic of India is known as the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement or Indo-US nuclear deal
2.  The framework for this agreement was a July 18, 2005, joint statement by then Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush,

1.  Under which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and to place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India
2.  This U.S.-India deal took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of U.S. domestic law, especially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
3.  On August 18, 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors approved, and on February 2, 2009, India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA
4.  Once India brings this agreement into force, inspections began in a phased manner on the 35 civilian nuclear installations India has identified in its Separation Plan
5.  On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India, after which the United States approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group] (NSG) to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear trade.
6. The 45-nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6, 2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries
7.  The implementation of this waiver made India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.
8. The U.S. House of Representatives passed the bill to approve the deal on September 28, 2008. Two days later, India and France inked a similar nuclear pact making France the first country to have such an agreement with India
9.  On October 1, 2008 the U.S. Senate also approved the civilian nuclear agreement allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from the United States
10.  U.S. President, George W. Bush, signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal, approved by the U.S. Congress, into law, now called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, on October 8, 2008
11.  The agreement was signed by then Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on October 10